Federalist paper 51 explained

Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election.To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.

Something still more positive and unequivocal has been evinced to be requisite.To treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, and to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character.The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate.In Pennsylvania, the representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents than of one for every four or five thousand.For this reason, that convention which passed the ordinance of government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time.It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation.How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense.

In this instance, also, the new provision is an improvement on the old.What are the sources of information by which the people in Montgomery County must regulate their judgment of the conduct of their representatives in the State legislature.By NECESSITATING a change of men, in the first office of the nation, it would necessitate a mutability of measures.

How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized.In cases in which a State might happen to be a party, it would ill suit its dignity to be turned over to an inferior tribunal.But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society.The effect of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly, will be just the contrary.In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective characters.It is to little purpose to say, that a neglect or omission of this kind would not be likely to take place.Federalist No. 39 Federalist No. 39, written by James Madison, is an explanation the character of the new republican system of government created under the Constitution.Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States.

In the courts of common law only, the trial by jury prevails, and this with some exceptions.The plan of the convention declares that the power of Congress, or, in other words, of the NATIONAL LEGISLATURE, shall extend to certain enumerated cases.In some of them every cause is to be tried in a court of common law, and upon that foundation every action may be considered as an action at common law, to be determined by a jury, if the parties, or either of them, choose it.But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least objectionable among the practicable rules, and had too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with the convention.The circumstances that may distinguish its situation in one State from its situation in another must be few, simple, and easy to be comprehended.It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had himself the sole disposition of offices, would be governed much more by his private inclinations and interests, than when he was bound to submit the propriety of his choice to the discussion and determination of a different and independent body, and that body an entire branch of the legislature.

The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States From the New York Packet.These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties.And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the people.

One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who take notice of Achaean affairs.There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections.It would be a full answer to this question to say--precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world.It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State itself.In this case, if the particular tribunals are invested with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion, there will be much to fear from the bias of local views and prejudices, and from the interference of local regulations.Thus, we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert.Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances, and notwithstanding some very unequal laws in the British code, it cannot be said that the representatives of the nation have elevated the few on the ruins of the many.The Federalist Papers were a series of eighty-five essays urging the citizens of New York to ratify the new United States Constitution.Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it.

Suppose, in lieu of one general system, two, or three, or even four Confederacies were to be formed, would not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations of either of these Confederacies.No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded.Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department an idea inadmissible in a free government.